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THE LAW OF CHILD CUSTODY: DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE
LAW. By Shirley Wohl Kram & Neil A. Frank. Lexington: Lex-
ington Books, 1982. Pp. xvi, 176. $21.00.
Reviewed by the Honorable Rose McBrien*
The practice of domestic relations law is both difficult and
painful-difficult in that the body of law is complex and unpre-
dictable, and painful in that the client is emotionally involved
and does not understand the difficulties. The area of child cus-
tody is perhaps the most frustrating to the practitioner and to
the client alike.
How does the practitioner explain the obscurities of the
child custody law to a parent intent on getting his or her chil-
dren at any cost? "It is undisputed that 'the best interest of the
children' must govern in the adjudication of custody" in the
State of New York.1 The law also tells us that in all cases there
shall be no prima facie right to the custody of the child in either
parent.2 "The only absolute in the law governing custody of chil-
dren is that there are no absolutes."' Considering this body of
law, it can be argued that such guidance appears to be no guid-
ance at all. Each party believes that the custodial relationship in
the best interests of the child would include that party as the
custodial parent. This is usually the basis of the custody battle.
In order to counsel a litigant and prepare for trial, an attorney
must explore the myriad factors which a court may consider and
the weight that will be given each one. This book, with its de-
tailed historical overview of child custody, is a valuable aid to
attorneys in custody litigation.
The authors of this thoughtfully presented dissertation aim
to present a "comprehensive analysis of the conceptual evolution
of judicial and legislative policy toward the resolution of dis-
puted child-custody proceedings."'4 The value of this work is in
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its treatment of historical development in setting the tone for
current judicial thought in child-custody disputes. Through his-
torical perspective certain predictabilities can be derived. The
authors use the law of New York State to demonstrate the de-
velopment of the law of child custody; other jurisdictions are
compared and contrasted in order that valid conclusions may be
drawn on a broad national scale.
This volume is directed to the substantive law in terms of
the relief that a court of law may award. A future volume will be
devoted to procedural and ancillary topics in this area of the
law. The work thus far completed covers three major categories
of substantive relief: "(1) custody, or choosing which contestant
will have the ultimate control and/or physical possession of the
minor child; (2) visitation, or the extent to which an adversary
party will obtain the company and limited control of a minor
child for a specified time; and (3) counsel fees, which concerns
the liability of the parties to the potentially crippling expense of
litigating the first two enumerated issues. ' '5
The authors begin with a brief discussion of subject matter
jurisdiction, averring that the substantive issues cannot be stud-
ied in a vacuum. Only the procedural knowledge necessary to
gain access to the courts is presented.
The authors then delve into the historical basis for the law
of child custody, beginning with the common law preference for
custody in the father. In an 1837 decision, People ex rel. Nicker-
son," the New York Supreme Court found a prima facie right in
the father to the custody of a child, citing an impressive list of
old English decisions as authority. It was felt that "the interfer-
ence of the court with the relation of father and child, by with-
drawing the latter from the natural affection, kindness and obli-
gations of the former, is a delicate and strong measure; and the
power should never be exerted except for the most sound and
solid reasons."'
The Tender Years Doctrine, the rule of law that enshrined
the mother as the preferred parent in most custody disputes, de-
veloped slowly, originally as exceptions to the common law right
5. Id. at xv.
6. 19 Wend. 16 (1837).
7. Id. at 19.
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of custody in the father. During the late 1800's, although the
father's prima facie right to custody was still intact, courts be-
came increasingly more liberal in finding reasons for awarding
custody to the mother. In the 1904 decision of People ex. rel.
Sinclair v. Sinclair," the court found that the "tender years" of
the children was reason enough to award custody to the mother.
The presumption in favor of the father eventually gave way
under the Tender Years Doctrine, which came to full maturity
in the case of Ullman v. Ullman.9 The court held that "[t]he
child at tender age is entitled to have such care, love and disci-
pline as only a good and devoted mother can usually give."1 ° Up
to this point the father had enjoyed a natural right to his chil-
dren unless the mother could persuade the court otherwise.
With this decision, the burden was reversed.
The succeeding sixty years, the authors tell us, found the
law presuming that the mother was better suited to care for
young children. The major exception to the rule was in cases of
flagrant adultery.
Only recently has the law recognized the demise of the pre-
sumptions that gave credence to the Tender Years Doctrine.
Women are no longer expected to stay home with their children.
It is often incumbent upon the wife to enter the work force in
order to better provide for the family. Likewise, it is widely rec-
ognized that a father may assume much of the responsibility in
the care and upbringing of his children. The days when a father
remained aloof with regard to such matters are gladly over.
Although there is no longer a prima facie right of custody in
either parent, old prejudices die slowly. The painstaking history
of the Tender Years Doctrine provided by the authors demon-
strates to those new to the child custody field how far the rights
of fathers have had to come. The slowness with which the law
has evolved suggests that fathers still have some distance to
travel before prejudice and misapprehension about their role
disappears. Actual parity between fathers and mothers with re-
spect to their right to custody may not occur for some time.
What does this historical perspective mean to the practi-
8. 91 A.D. 322, 86 N.Y.S. 539 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904).
9. 151 A.D. 419, 135 N.Y.S. 1080. (N.Y. App. Div. 1912).
10. Id. at 424-25, 135 N.Y.S. at 1083.
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tioner counseling a client in a child-custody dispute? It seems
incumbent on the father that he show he is capable of caring for
and raising the children. In this enlightened age, as previously
mentioned, it is no longer unusual for the father to take an ac-
tive role in these endeavors. Most courts would assume the
mother fit unless it is otherwise demonstrated. The threshold
question is whether both parents can adequately care for the
children. If both are fit, the court must explore other issues, in-
cluding finances, living arrangements, "environment and psycho-
logical aspects. Therefore, the first order of business for the fa-
ther is to prove himself capable of child care, thus clearing the
Tender Years Doctrine hurdle. Then he must establish his supe-
riority in terms of other considerations. For her part, the mother
must show her superior ability to care for the children, or the
father's lack thereof. Then she must turn her attention to the
other factors.
The authors next consider the current standards for the de-
termination of custodial disputes. Recognizing that all cases in-
volve degrees of fitness, rather than declaring a parent fit or un-
fit, a broad spectrum of factors are discussed. Also of interest is
the treatment afforded the effect of illegitimacy on custodial dis-
putes, the rights of third parties as against the natural parents,
and visitation.
Counsel fees, a subject of noteworthy importance in such
disputes, is dealt with thoughtfully and thoroughly at the con-
clusion of this work.
The authors have written an excellent study of the law of
child custody. The insight-provided through historical perspec-
tive should be helpful to any practitioner immersed in this diffi-
cult and painful area of the law.
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